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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JERRY SKOUSEN,
vs.
ALVIN I. SMITH,

Plaintiff,

Case No.
11598

Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This action was brought to recover on a nonnegotiable promissory note signed by the defendant,
Alvin I. Smith, Attorney, while he was representing
a client in negotiations with respect to a real estate
transaction in Arizona.
The defense is that no cause of action has yet
accrued since the conditions expressly stated in the
non-negotiable note have not yet occurred. The note
provides: "It is understood and agreed that the drawer of this note shall not be liable hereunder until and
unless payment is received from Clifford R. Walker
on notes executed by him in the total sum of $13,977. 70".

'The plaintiff pleads a second claim based on allegations that the defendant failed to take action re-quired to recover on the two notes payable to the de1

fendant the collection of which was a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to recovery.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The District Court granted judgment for the
plaintiff for the amount of the note, interest and attorney's fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and
judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or that
failing, a new trial.
While it may not be within the issues in this case,
in order to avoid further litigation, this defendant
would consent to an order of this court to assign to
the plaintiff an interest in the Walker notes or the
judgment now entered against C. R. Walker to the
full extent of the amount which has now accrued on
the note held by the plaintiff. This would permit the
plaintiff to directly move aga:inst C. R. Walker on
that judgment if the plaintiff feels that he could effect recovery from C. R. Walker more expeditiously
than the defendant and his counsel have been able to.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was brought against the defendant
on a non-negotiable promissory note which contains
this clause:
"It is understood and agreed that the
drawer of this note shall not be liable hereunder until and unless payment is received
Clifford R. Walker on notes executed by him
in the total sum of $13,977.70".
2

This note was signed in conjunction with two
real estate transactions in which the Coronado Land
Company, a partnership, was involved. The plaintiff
is one of the partners of Coronado Land Company.
(Tr. 50, L. 10)
Prior to January 15, 1962, Coronado Land Company, a partnership, of which plaintiff was a member was negotiating with one Clifford R. Walker for
an exchange of two apartment houses in Phoenix, one
of which was known as the Pharoah Apartments for
some acreage in Arizona. Before that transaction
could be completed, Walker was obliged to provide
funds to cover delinquent mortgage payments and
delinquent taxes on the Pharoah Apartments. The
detail of that encumbrance is here set forth:
Property Taxes ______________________ $5,240.81
Interest -----------------------------------60.68
General Property Taxes
and interest _______________________ _
Special Assessments ______________
Interest ------------------------------------

380.01
4.50

Total Special Assessments
and interest ________________________
Total Taxes and Interest ______
Mortgage delinquency and
interest amounting to ________ 8,286.21
Additional interest accrued
before date of payment ______
5.49

5,301.49

384.51
5,686.00

Total mortgage delinquency
including interest ______________

8,291.70

Total obligation to
C. R. Walker ----------------------

$ 13,977.70

Walker was not in funds to clear these obligations and the partnership of Coronado requested this
defendant, then negotiating on behalf of his client,
Stoller, with Coronado for the acquisition of the Pharoah Apartments, to determine whether Smith could
arrange to provide the funds for Walker to cover the
$13,977.70 on condition that Coronado would take
one-half of the risk. On these terms Smith agreed
with Coronado to have client Stoller make a loan of
$13,977.70 to Walker. The seller suggested that the
defendant act as intermediary (Tr. 55, L. 15-30)
to disburse the $13,977.70 and then to receive payment on these promissory notes for monies advanced
by his client and from the money so to be received that
he pay over one-half thereof to his client, the buyer,
and the other one-half to the seller of the property,
the Seller's one-half being represented by the note
herein sued upon. Smith was to receive $13,977.70
from his client Stoller and disburse the $13,977.70
paying $8,291. 70 directly to the mortgagee and $5,686.00 to the County for Taxes. In order to divide the
risk equally between Stoller (Smith's client) and
Coronado, Coronado on January 15, 1962 agreed it
would accept a note for the $6,988.85 balance of the
purchase price, exactly one-half of the $13,977.70
payable when Sm'ith collected $13,977.70 from Walker. (Tr. 52, L. 6 to Tr. 53, L. 23)

Q And did your client, Mrs. Stoller, advance

that amount of thirteen thousand, some
odd dollars, to pay these delinquent items?
4

A She did.
Q And that was done so the property would
be clear when a trade was made with Stollers for the Pharoah Apartments?
MR. FRAZIER: We object to that as leading
and suggestive.
THE COURT: It is that.
MR. ARNOVITZ: Well, I can rephrase it.
THE COURT: All right. Let him answer. It is
leading.
A Under another agreement between Coronado and Cerene and Walker, Coronado
had agreed to cause to be loaned to Cerene
and Walker the thirteen thousands dollars
in order to clear this up so the transaction
could be made, and Cornado then asked me
to have my client loan the money, and the
money was so loaned, and Walker then
gave those notes.
Q (By Mr. Arnovitz) And what relationship
did the amount of the note given to Mr.
Skousen, or to the Coronado Land Company have to the total of these two notes?
THE COURT: Well, it is half.
MR. ARN OVITZ: Yes, rt is exactly one-half,
but we wanted to show the reason for it, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
A Under the purchase - under the purchase
agreement which you have had marked as
ExhibitTHE COURT: '''D-5."
A (Continuing) "D-5" $23,000.00 was the
purchase price to be paid by Stoller to Cor5

onado. The purchase price was to be paid at
the - May I have the exhibit to refresh my
memory as to the amount? The purchase
price was to be paid according to the
agreement made with Coronado by the payment of cash of $16,011.15, and I was instructed by Coronado to deliver a note for
$6,988.85 to Skousen, which that was onehalf, the agreement being with Coronado
that although Stoller would advance the
full amount that the risk would be on Coronado to guarantee all amounts paid out
over and above $23,000.00, so that Mrs.
Stoller was to receive $6,988.85, at which
time the balance would go to Skousen, and
thereby the purchase price of $23,000.00
would have been paid.
Q In other words, adding to the $16,011.15
the $6,988.85 note would have made up the
total purchase price of $23,000.00?
A Yes. Now, as this whole agreement as to
the purchase price was completed, an agreement made with Coronado as a partnership
and as the owner, we were instructed by
them whom the note was to be paid to and
how it was to be handled there.
On the following day on behalf of his client,
Smith agreed to purchase the Pharoah Apartments
for the sum of $23,000.00 subject to the foregoing
encumbrances of $13,977.70 knowing that he already
had in his hands the $13,977.70 for which Walker had
executed the two notes with which to remove these
encumbrances. Since the Coronado Land Company
had agreed to accept one-half of the risk of the loan
6

to vValker, the method adopted to have them take the
risk was to defer payment of $6,988.85 of the purchase price until such time as Walker paid the two
notes.
The Coronado Land Company, a partnership,
directed that the note for this amount be made payable to one of the partners, Jerry Skousen, the plaintiff herein. (Tr. 53, L. 19-23) This note is dated
February 1, 1962, fifteen days after the dates of the
two Walker notes and is made payable fifteen days
after the date it was expected that the money would
be received on the two Walker notes. This fifteen day
interval between the date Walker was to pay the two
notes amounting to $13,977.70 and the date when
Smith would then have been obligated to pay the note
of $6,988.85 to this plaintiff would have been sufficient time to have prevented any default by Smith in
the payment of this note to the plaintiff.
The Walker notes were not paid on their due
date of January 15, 1964. Beginning in January,
1964 Smith gave Walker notice that the two notes
were coming due. (Tr. 35). When payment by Walker was not forthcoming, Smith contacted Walker.
Walker was a resident of Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
In April, 1964, Walker was in Salt Lake City to attend the Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints and Smith located him in Salt Lake
City and made demand upon him for payment of the
two notes. Walker promised to make payment. When
7

Walker returned to Calgary, sometime after April,
1964, he sent a payment of $2,500.00 to apply on one
of the notes and it was so applied.

Q Was the $2,500.00 credited to one of those

notes? (Tr. 35, L.1-2)
A It was.
Walker also had agreed to make further pay.
ments of $2,500.00 per month until the total of $13,977. 70 plus interest was paid. After April, 1964 when
no further payments were being received, Smith continually attempted to pressure Walker into making
these payments. (Tr. 37) Smith had a difficult time
to con tact Walker in Calgary and Smith knew that
he usually came to Conference in Salt Lake City twice
a year and when he was unable to contact Walker
here, he hired private detectives to check the hotels to
see if he could find him in order to serve him with
summons and sue on the notes, but he was unable to
trace him down in Salt Lake City. Smith went to Calgary in the Fall of 1966 and spent a day trying to find
Walker in Calgary. (Tr. 37) Smith found his office
closed and no one answered at Walker's home in Calgary. Smith went through Calgary again a week later
and was unable to contact him. After Smith returned
to Salt Lake City, in November, 1966 he requested
Irwin Arnovitz, his associate, to take whatever steps
were necessary to effect recovery of the Walker notes.
Irwin Arnovitz, referred the matter to Calgary counsel and Mr. Smith made an advance of $200.00 in
court costs to commence suit against Walker. Coun8

1,

e

sel in Calgary then advised that Walker could not be
located in Calgary and that Walker was probably in
Utah. Smith then tried to locate Walker in Utah;
Smith had met Walker's father-in-law, President
Tanner, and had his secretary call Mrs. Tanner to
find out where her daughter and son-in-law (\Valker) were living and Mrs. Tanner gave her an address
in Orem, Utah. Soon after that an action was started
on the two Walker notes. Smith talked to Walker
shortly afterward and Walker told him that summons
had been served on him just ten days after he came
back to Orem.
The suit against Walker was commenced in the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in and
for Utah County, Case #31235 on September 12,
1967. During the pendency of the suit, negotiations
were carried on with Walker in an effort to collect
these notes. Exhibit R3. Walker agreed with Smith
that he would contact Mr. Frazier, Skousen's attorney and pay him the amount of the Skousen note and
would obtain from Frazier a dismissal with prejudice
of this suit and agreed to pay Smith the amount due
to his client but after first paying Skousen. Smith
agreed that Walker could pay Skousen before paying
him but unfortunately Walker has paid neither one.
Counsel for Smith attempted to obtain some security
from Walker which could be applied to the payment
of both Walker notes and received an assignment of
some funds alleged to be due to Walker from the Banner Corporation and on which there was some expec9

tation that there would be paid to Walker a rather
large sum. (Ex. D-4) When the assignment was exon May 10, 1968 and the assignment was accepted by the Banner Corporation on May 16, 1968,
it was expected that Walker's one-third interest
would exceed $100,000.00 and that the $13,977.70
would be paid in full. Like many such transactions,
the payment of $100,000.00 did not materialize and
indeed no sum was paid over by the Banner Corporation for the benefit of Walker or for the payment of
the amount due to Mr. Smith's client. Because of this
inability to force Walker to pay the $13,977.70, Smith
was unable to fulfill the obligation which he had gratui tiously undertaken and for which he received no
benefit of any kind but has suffered the burden of
attempting to collect the Walker notes, has expended
his money to pay court costs in Canada and in Utah
and has suffered the burden of defending this action.
Mr. Frazier, counsel for the plaintiff, examined Mr.
Smith as to why he had signed this promissory note.
(Tr. 55, L. 14) CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. FRAZIER:
Q Mr. Smith, how come you happened to sign
this promissory note?
A I was acting as an intermediary for the
parties because my client did not want to
be - She didn't know all of the details of
this. I was merely a nominee, part of collection and the paying out, acting between as
a negotiator and the intermediary between
Coronado, Walker and Stoller.
10

MR. FRAZIER: I have no further questions.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ARNOVITZ:
A Now, as a matter of fact you have never
had any financial interest in this personally at all?
THE COURT: You are not claiming anything.
This is in your answer.
MR. ARNOVITZ: No, we don't, but just for
the purpose of the record, counsel has just
opened that matter up, and I want to amplify
it.
Q (By Mr. Arnovitz) You have had no financial interest in this transaction, and none
of the proceeds would come to you in any
way?
A In no way.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO CAUSE OF ACTION HAD ACCRUED TO
THE PLAINTIFF ON THE NOTE HEREIN
SUED UPON AND THE COURT SH 0 UL D
HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR DISMISSAL AND NON-SUIT.

This point was raised by the defendant at the
very outset of the trial. The execution of the note
having been admitted, the court suggested that the
burden to go forward would be on the defendant but
the defendant raised the point: "That there is no liability under the note unless and until the two notes
executed by C. R. Walker are paid in the total amount
of $13,977.70". Counsel for the defendant then con11

tinued (Tr. 28) - '''It seems to me that it is incumbent upon them first to show that such amount has
been paid; if that amount hasn't been paid there is
no claim accrued as yet" - Plain tiff's counsel then
agreed that he had the burden of establishing the
facts to show that the note had become payable and
that a cause of action had accrued. (Tr. 28 and 29)
The execution of the note was admitted by the
defendant as was the fact that the defendant has
received one payment of $2,500.00 on one of the notes.
(Tr. 34, L. 17 Tr. 35, L. 2)
A I received $2,500.00 on one of the notes.
Q When did you receive that payment?
A I believe it was in April of '62, or what is
the date of the note?
THE COURT: February 1st.
THE WITNESS: Of what year?
THE COURT: 1962.
THE WITNESS: I mean April of 1964.
Q (By Mr. Frazier) You received $2,500.00
from Mr. Walker in payment on one of his
notes?
A Yes.
Q How many notes were there comprising the
$13,000.00 as alleged or set forth on that
prom'issory note?
A Two notes.
Q And was the $2,500.00 credited to one of
those notes?
12

A It was.
The plaintiff offered no other evidence as to the
time when the note became payable nor any evidence
to explain the ambiguity in the note. Thus on a Motion for non-suit, the District Court had only the four
corners of the note and the single fact that one payment of $2,500.00 had been made on one of the notes
in April, 1964 from wltich the court could find that
the note had become payable before this suit was commenced.
The clause in the note as to the time payable
reads:
'"It is understood and agreed that the
drawer or this note shall not be liable hereunder until and unless payment is received from
Clifford R. Walker on notes executed by him
in the total sum of $13,977.70".
'The plaintiff's contention must be that the note
became payable in April, 1964 when the one payment
of $2,500.00 was received on one of the notes. The
condition in the note is - "payment-on notes-in
the total sum of $13,977.70". The meaning of the
phrase becomes clear and obvious when the phrases
in this clause of the note are put in their proper grammatical sequence. When that is done, the clause reads
without inserting a single letter or word as follows:
"It is understood and agreed that the drawer of this
note shall not become liable hereunder until and unless payment is received in the total sum of $13,977.70
from Clifford R. Walker on notes executed by him".
13

Likewise, the clause is crystal clear, when the
letter "n" in the word "on" is changed to the letter
"f" so that the clause as so changed would read:

"It is understood and agreed that the
drawer of this note shall not be liable hereunder until and unless payment is received from
Clifford R. Walker of notes executed by him
in the total sum of $13,977. 70".
Counsel for the plaintiff is asking the court to
read the clause as though the article "a" preceded the
word "payment". However, no evidence was offered
to that effect and on the contrary the plaintiff testified that what he had requested Smith to do was to
collect the notes that were due from Mr. Walker and
not merely to obtain a payment from Mr. Walker so
that his note would become payable. (Tr. 31, L. 26
to Tr. 32, L. 1) Had any such evidence been offered
defendant has in its possession a letter written by the
plaintiff to Mr. Frazier his attorney, a copy of which
he mailed to the defendant in which he acknowledged
that the note in suit did not become payable until full
payment of the two Walker notes. That evidence
would have been offered in rebuttal, if plaintiff had
given any testimony that there was an agreement
that the note should be 'interpreted as though it read,
"a payment". We attach that letter as an appendix to
this Brief.
From the following question of counsel for the
plaintiff, we have an indication that he interpreted
the Skousen note as providing that it did not become
14

payable until Smith collected the two notes from
Walker.
Question by Mr. Frazier: Did you have
any conversation with Mr. Smith specifically
about taking action against Mr. Walker in
collecting the notes that were due from Mr.
Walker?
A. Yes. I felt my security was being impaired. I had numerous conversations with him
asking him to proceed and get this collected.
(Emphasis ours) (Counsel is of the opinion
that the word '"this" should be "these") (Tr.
31-32)
Accordingly, it seems clear that the plaintiff
knew that this note was not payable until and unless
the notes executed by Walker in the total sum of $13,977. 70 were collected - not partly collected.
The answer given by the plaintiff likewise suggests the same thing, when the plaintiff used the
word "security". There is nothing in the note to Skousen stating it is a secured note, as indeed it is not.
What Skousen must have meant by the use of the
word "security" was that whatever funds he was to
receive in payment of his note would have their origin
in the collection of the two Walker notes.
The District Oourt ascribed a meaning to the
word "payment" that does not conform to either the
dictionary or legal definition of that word. No evidence was offered that the word "payment" was to
have a meaning different from its dictionary or legal
15

meaning. Webster's Imperial Dictionary defines payment as:
"The thing given in discharge of a debt
or fulfillment of a promise".
The same dictionary defines the word '''pay" as follows:
"To get rid of or satisfy as a debt, duty, or
obligation, by performing an action required
or by delivery of something or some amount in
satisfaction; to satisfy ones debts, duties or
obligations".
A partial amount paid on an obligation is not "payment" but one installment of a given number of installments that may be required to make payment of
an obligation. The word "payment" does not require
the addition of any word or article to be correctly understood. Definitions of the word "payment" as they
appear in Vol. 31-A, Words & Phrases a:t page 216,
217, 233 and 234 follow:
Page 216 - ''Payment" meant in full and not
in part or a compromise for a part. in re Thornwall's ES'tate, 10 N.W. 2d 35, 233 Iowa 626.
"Payment" of an obligation connotes fulfillment of it according to its terms. Stone vs.
Webster, 144 P.2d 466, 468, 65 Idaho 392.
Page 217 - "Payment" of a debt is made by
debtor's delivery to creditor of money or some
other valuable thing, and creditor's receipt
thereof, for purpose of extinguishing debt.
Moses vs. United States, D.C.N.Y., 28 F. Supp.
817, 818.
Page 233 - "Payment signifies the discharge
16

of a debt, obligation of duty. In re Gray's
Estate, 290 NYS 603, 607, 160 Misc. 710.
'"Payment" implies satisfaction or discharge of an indebtedness or claim. Dennett
vs. Goelet, 256 NYS. 393, 395, 143 Misc. 195.
"Payment" implies discharge of an obligation according to its terms or by something
given or received of agreed value equal to the
debt or liability. Crutchfield vs.
&
Latimer, 8 So. 2d 412, 414, 243 Ala. 73.
"Payment" is a mode of extinguishing a
debt. Bradford vs. Richard, 16 So. 487, 489,
46 La. Ann. 1530.
Page 234 - "Payment 'is generally understood
as a discharge of the debt or obligation by a
compliance with the terms of the obligation,
and, if the obligation calls for a money discharge, then there cannot be payment except
by paying the full amount called for in money,
or the representative of money. Casper vs.
Mayer, 43 P. 2d 467, 472, 171 Okl. 457 - citing Continental Gin vs. Arnold, 52 Okla. 569,
153 P. 160, 2.
The word "payment", which is not a technical term, means the discharge in money or
its equivalent of a debt or obligation or the
actual or constructive delivery by a debtor to
his creditor or money or its equivalent with
intent to thereby extinguish the debt, and acceptance thereof by creditor with same intent.
Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, Ind. Revenue
Bd., Ind. Gross Income Tax Division vs. Colpaert Realty Corp., 109 N.E. 2d 415, 419, 231
Ind. 463.
The word '"payment" has a specified and
17

clear meaning, which is that a claim has been
paid. Readings vs. M cM enmnin, Del., 39 A.
463, 464, 1 Pennewill, 15.
Thus if we substitute for the word "payment"
its legal definition, the clause would then have this
meaning: "It is understood and agreed that Smith
shall not be liable hereunder until and unless funds
discharging or extinquishing notes executed by C. R.
"\Valker in the total sum of $13,977.70 are received
by Smith".
How incongruous it would be to believe that a
clause would be placed in a note to defer the accrual
of a cause of action on a note to a time when "a payment" would be received on a note amounting to $13,977. 70. Thus the condition of the note could be met
by making a nominal payment of $1.00 or $100.00.
Under the ruling of the District Court if "\Valker had
paid Smith $100.00 on the $13,977.70 note then Smith
became immediately liable to pay and discharge the
Walker note. The intermediary would then be put
in the untenable position of being forced to pay the
note and interest amounting in all to approxima:tely
$8,000.00 when he would have collected only $100.00.
The fifteen day interval between the maturity
date of the Walker notes, January 15, 1964 and February 1, 1964 the original maturity date of the note
in question, conclusively shows that it was the full
payment of the Walker note that was the condition
required before plaintiff's note was to be paid on February 1, 1964. Tha;t was the source of funds that the
18

"intermediary" Smith expected to apply to the payment of the Skousen note. It was never intended that
Smith should pay this note out of his funds, but it was
clear tha:t it was the intention that the source of funds
that the intermediary Smith was to apply to the payment of this note was the monies to be received from
Walker. This becomes ever clearer when it is noted
that the real esta:te transaction was closed on January
16, 1962. This note, a part of that transaction, was
deliberately dated fifteen days after the transaction
was closed.
The furthest limit to which the plaintiff would
testify as what facts there were to show that the note
was payable at the time of the commencement of this
action is this statement: ''When I was informed that
Mr. Walker had paid him $2,500.00, then I felt that
my obligation should be satisfied". (Tr. 32, L. 9-11)
(Emphasis ours) The plaintiff did not testify that
there was any conversation at the time of the execution of the note to the effect that his note would become payable when $2,500.00 was paid on one of the
Walker notes. Again it is clear, that the plaintiff
knew that this note was not payable unless and until
the full amount of the two Walker notes were collected.

Weight must be given to the use of the words
"total sum". The New Century Dictionary, Vol. 2,
published 1942 by D. Appleton - Century Co. defines the word "total" as "the total amount, sum or
aggregate (as, add the several times to find the to19

tal) ; "all", "whole", '·'entire"; "constituting or comprising the whole", "entire (as the total amount expended").
Similarly, the words "unless" and "until", the
dictionary cited above states that the word "unless"
is generally followed by a ''specification of some condition". The condition here is that Smith has no liability unless payment is received in the total sum of
$13,977.70 discharging in full the two notes of C.R.
Walker.
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff

presented no evidence whatever to the effect that the
note became payable prior to the commencement of
this action and that defendant's motion for a non-suit
and a dismissal should have been granted.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED ANY
FACTS 'TO SUSTAIN 'THE SECOND CLAIM

The intermediary Smith was diligent in his efforts to collect the Walker notes. The statement of
facts relates the activities of Smith in trying to collect the Walker notes. They reach all the way from
constant pressure on Walker to pay the notes to having a detective try to locate Walker, to himself trying
to locate Walker in Calgary, to calling Walker's mother-in-law in Salt Lake for information as to his
whereabouts, to advancing $200.00 of his own money
to sue Walker, to having his associate file a suit when
Walker was finally located. Smith never asked Skou20

sen to participate in the expenses of suitor to advance
attorney's fees or to pay for the private detective.
Smith did all this without Skousen in a sincere effort
to collect the Walker notes. Paraphrasing, if he was
not a gratuitous bailee, he certainly was a "gratuitous
intermediary". There is no evidence that there was
any time after January 15, 1964, that the notes owing
by
could have been collected with or without
suit. There is no evidence of any negligence on the
part of Smith and no evidence of any damage to Skousen. Damages could have resulted to Skousen only if
it could have been shown that between January 15,
1964 and September 12, 1967 a judgment against
Walker could have been collected. The evidence is
clear that when suit was brought and judgment entered that Smith's counsel, who obtained the judgment against Walker, has not been able to satisfy
that judgment.
POINT III
THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CLAIM CONSTITUTE AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT PLAIN TI F F KNEW
THAT HIS NOTE WAS NOT PAYABLE UNTIL
SMITH COLLECTED THE TWO WALKE R
NOTES.

The allegations in Paragraph 1 of plaintiff's
Second Cause of Action give the plaintiff's interpretation of the conditional clause in the note:
"That in addition to the allegations set
forth in the First Cause of Action, Defendant
has failed, neglected, and refused, and does
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now fail, neglect or r e f u s e to take action
against Clifford R. Walker on the promissory
note which the Defendant holds against Clifford R. Walker; and as a result, the defendant
is attempting to postpone the time of payment
on his own promissory note to the plaintiff and
that the defendant is guilty of laches, has not
acted in good faith, and has prevented the
plaintiff from collecting on his promissory
note because of the misconduct and failures of
the Defendant."
Plaintiff there interprets the conditional clause
as allowing the defendant to postpone the time of payment of the note, something which defendant could
do only by failing to collect the note. Therefore, plaintiff acknowledges that the collection of the Walker
notes is a con di ti on precedent to the liability of the
defendant on the note in suit. Plaintiff further alleges the defendant has not acted in good faith in failing to file suit against Walker. Th'is makes it clear
that the plaintiff wanted an action to be brought
against Walker for the recovery of $13,977.70 because he knew that Smith would not become liable
until collection of this amount was made. The allegation that Smith has prevented the plaintiff from collecting on this note is to the same effect. The only
way Smith could prevent Skousen from collecting on
his note was to refuse to collect from Walker. Again
this is an acknowledgement that Smith does not become liable to Skousen until he collected the two
Walker notes. See -3 Corbin on Cntracts, Page 42:
"We must observe on the other hand that
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if the second party knows the meaning that the
first party intended to convey by his words,
then he is himself bound by that meaning of the
words. The same is true if he had reason to
know what the first party intended."
See also 3 Corbin on Contracts, Page 44:
"How is a court to find out whether either
party knew or had reason to know the intent
or understanding of the other? Knowledge of
such a factor may be proved by any evidence
that is ordinarily admitted to prove a state of
mind. This would include the party's own admissions, his actions from which knowledge
may be inferred, testimony of statements and
information given him from which knowledge
may reasonably be inferred, and the usages
and meanings of third persons with which he
probably was familiar. The fact that one had
'reason to know' is some evidence that he did
know; but is far from conclusive".
'"The court will not interpret the words of
an agreement so as to hold one party bound in
accordance with the wholly unexpressed intentions and meanings and understandings of the
other. A contractor is bound in accordance with
the meaning that he induces another to understand and act upon, if he knows or has reason
to know that the other will so understand and
act. And in determining whether or not he has
reason to know, the court should be advised of
all the surrounding circumstances ; of the
meaning that is given to the language of the
agreement by the parties; of communications
between the parties during preliminary negotiations and during the execution of the writing; and of subsequent interpretations and
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practical applicatwn by either party that is
assented to or acted upon by the other." (Em
phasis ours)
PONIT IV
THE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO OFFER ANY
EVIDENCE THAT THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE NOTE AS TO WHEN DEFENDANT
BECOMES LIABLE UNDER IT WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT MAKES IT NECESSARY FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO FIND IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT

The defendant testified as to the facts and circumstances at the time of the delivery of the note that
the meaning of the allegedly ambiguous phrase is
that the maker is not to be liable on the note until and
unless he received payment of the total sum of $13,977.70 on two notes executed by Walker. The payee
of the note produced no evidence of a different interpretation and, therefore, the interpretation of the
maker of the note is the only possible interpretation
to be adopted by the court. See - Clark vs. State
Street Trust Company, 169 N.E. 897, 270 Mass. 140,
referred to in Note 40 of 3 Corbin on Contracts, Page
38:
"'The aim of all interpretation of writings
is to ascertain the meaning intended 'to be attached to the words by the parties who used
them, and to effectuate the true purpose of the
parties as there ascertained. All rules are ancillary to that dominating one".
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POINT V
THERE IS NO FINDING THAT THE NOTE
SIGNED BY THE DEFENDANT WAS PAYABLE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACTION.

Finding of Fact #2 states that the note was
payable within two years provided the drawer of the
note had received payments on promissory notes
which the defendant held on C. R. Walker. There is
no evidence that the defendant had received payments
on the notes "within two years after the date of the
note." The note is dated February 1, 1962 and for
any payment to have been received within two years
from date, the payment would have had to have been
made before February 1, 1964. The only payment
was in April, 1964. Accordingly, under this Finding
of Fact, the note was not payable and the defendant
had no liability thereunder at the time of the commencement of this action.
Finding of Fact #3 signed on March 9, 1969 recites that the note is now past due and payable. There
is not a finding that the note was payable at the time
of the commencement of the action. Since there is no
finding that this note was payable when the action
was commenced, there is no basis for the Conclusion
of Law that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
POINT VI
FINDING OF FACT No. 4 WHICH FINDS THAT
THE DEFENDANT HAS RECEIVED IN EXCESS OF $2,500.00 IN PAYMENTS ON NOTES
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE IN THREE
PARTICULARS.
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1. There was only one payment.

2. There was a payment on only one note.
3. The payment was $2,500.00 and not in excess of $2,500.00.
The Finding that there was a payment on notes
is prejudicial since such finding would indicate that
one of the conditions precedent to the note becoming
payable had been met. The condition precedent required payment of both notes.
POINT VII
THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT SUSTAIN
A JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFF.

One of the facts essential to the entry of judgment is a finding that the conditions in the note making the defendant liable on the note have occurred. As
referred to above, one of the conditions required to
make the defendant liable was that collection had
been made on notes executed by Walker. There is no
finding that collection of $13,977.70 was made on
notes signed by Walker. There is no finding that the
note in question was payable at the time of the commencement of the action.
POINT VIII
FINDING OF FACT No. 4 IN PART IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND IN PART IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. THUS
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 'TO SUS'TAIN
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CLAIM.

We are of the opinion that reasonable action was
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taken by the defendant in his efforts to collect the
notes from Walker. There is no need to repeat the
evidence in the record. The defendant recited the action taken by him in his efforts to collect the notes in
response to plaintiff's counsels questions as follows:
Question by Frazier: '"In between the time the
notes were executed and the time the action was filed
against you, what a c t i o n, if any, had you taken
against Mr. Walker to collect on the promissory notes
you held from him"? Smith recited what action he
had taken, see Tr. 35, 36, 37, 39 and 40.
The second clause of the Findings of Fact on
plaintiff's Second Claim reads: ''Because of the
Statute of Limitations and the possibility of plaintiff
losing his cause of action on the promissory note, his
action would appear to have been appropriately taken". The Court made a finding with reference to the
Statute of Limitations although the court had sustained an objection to the question inquiring whether
the plaintiff had become concerned about the Statute
of Limitations. (Tr. 31, L. 19-26). Therefore, there
is no evidence in the record that would sustain the
Conclusion of Law which was included as a part of
the Findings of Fact i.e. that "his action would appear to have been appropriately taken". Moreover,
the evidence as to the action taken by Smith to collect
the note referred to immediately above, clearly demonstrates that such conclusion of law is unwarranted.
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CONCLUSION
Counsel for defendant is of the opinion that
plaintiff has not stated a claim against the defendant
- that the evidence of the plaintiff does not establish
a claim and that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss
should have been granted. Counsel for defendant
urges this court to reverse the judgment and enter
an order that defendant had no liability on the note
in question at the time of the commencement of this
action.
Defendant restatees his offer to assign to the
plaintiff an interest in the judgment tha:t has been
entered against Walker to the full extent of the
amount that has accrued to date on the note held by
the plaintiff. Defendant would go further and even
assign the entire Walker judgment to the plaintiff if
plaintiff would now agree to act as intermediary and
pay over to the defendant any excess over the amount
that has accrued on plaintiff's note, if and when full
collection is made from Walker.
In such event, defendant's counsel would continue to give all possible assistance to collect the
Walker notes. Defendant makes this offer with the
consent of his client. Defendant has acted diligently
as intermediary and with his client's consent will
even go to this extent to assist the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
IRWIN AR'.NOVITZ
1309 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for
Defendant and Awellant
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APPENDIX
March 6, 1968

Mr. Leon Frazier
Attorney-at-Law
P. 0. Box 976
Provo, Utah
Dear Leon:

I had a telephone conversation, day before
terday, with Cliff Walker whereby he asked me if
something could be worked out with he and Alvin
Smith to bring this matter to a satisfactory conclusion. I told Mr. Walker that I was agreeable to anything as long as my position was made secure and that
I would receive the money as promised.
Mr. Walker also told me that he was going to be
required to give a deposi'tion regarding this note and
that this deposition was for the sum and sole purpose
of stating that the Twenty-five Hundred Dollars, received and acknowledged, was not applied against the
subject Thirteen Thousand and Nine Hundred and
Seventy-seven Dollars and Seventy Cents note from
Walker to Smith, made as a condition in the promissory note in the amount of Six Thousand and Nine
Hundred and Eighty-eight Dollars and Thirty-five
Cents, on the date of February 1, 1962, from Alvin
to me.
I wish to go on record to you and to all concerned
that I have several letters in my file from Cliff Walker stating that he had paid and applied Twenty-five
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Hundred Dollars on this said obligation and that the
balance would be forthcoming, to Alvin, in the very
nea1· future so that I would receive the balance of my
money. Also Alvin Smith acknowledged to me that
he had received Twenty-five Hundred Dollars from
Cliff Walker on ths obligation. However, regardless
of the circumstances prevailing, I would be most happy to come to Salt Lake City and sit down with you
and Alvin and Cliff Walker, if I can be of assistance
in bringing this matter to a sa:tisfactory conclusion
and get it dismissed from the courts.
I think Mr. Walker will recall one instance in
my office when he admitted to me in front of other
witnesses that he had paid Twenty-five Hundred Dollars on this obliga:tion. At that time he was in route to
Mexico and I advanced him Three Hundred Dollars
from my personal account, check number 2515, to
cover his expenses into Mexico.
Hoping this information clarifies the situation.
Sincerely,
Jerry Skousen
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CC : Mrs. Alvin Smith
Mr. C.R. Walker
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